《欧盟排放交易体系中的部门和企业额外利润的计算》报告.pdf

Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS 1 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS This report was prepared by Sander de Bruyn Ellen Schep Sofia Cherif Delft, CE Delft, March 2016 Publication code 16.7H44.18 Carbon dioxide / Tradable permits / Market / Industries / Companies / Profit / Analysis Client Carbon Market Watch. CE publications are available from www.cedelft.eu Further ination on this study can be obtained from the contact person, Sander de Bruyn. © copyright, CE Delft, Delft Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS CE Delft Committed to the Environment Through its independent research and consultancy work CE Delft is helping build a sustainable world. In the fields of energy, transport and resources our expertise is leading-edge. With our wealth of know-how on technologies, policies and economic issues we support government agencies, NGOs and industries in pursuit of structural change. For 35 years now, the skills and enthusiasm of CE Delft’s staff have been devoted to achieving this mission. 2 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS cutive summary This study has calculated the additional profits that sectors and companies have made from the EU ETS from 2008 to 2014, distinguishing between three types of profits 1. Profits from overallocation of free emission allowances. In many sectors/countries, free allowances have been granted in excess of verified emissions, allowing industries to generate additional profits by selling this surplus in the market. 2. Profits from using CDM/JI credits for compliance. Companies were entitled to a certain extent to use cheaper CDM/JI credits for compliance. This has created additional profits since many companies have used these credits for compliance and sold the saved freely obtained allowances on the ETS market. 3. Profits from passing through the opportunity costs of freely obtained allowances. There is a ample empirical evidence that companies have been able to pass through part of the carbon costs in product prices. Although the allowances were granted free of charge, the majority of sectors were thus able to pass through the opportunity costs of these allowances in product prices, thus making so-called windfall profits. Profits in each of these categories from 2008 to 2014 have been calculated for 15 sectors in general the most polluting ones in 19 countries. The analysis in this study differs from those in earlier studies on this subject by our having corrected for allocation of waste gases to the iron and steel industry, which have been transferred to the electricity sector on a statistical basis. In our view this yields a more accurate estimate of the extent of overallocation to the iron and steel sector compared with other studies. Our results show that between 2008 and 2014 European industry received additional profits amounting to over 8 billion euro through overallocation. There are considerable differences in the extent of overallocation per country. Spain had the highest profits, totalling over 1.6 billion euro. In Sweden as much as 33 of emission allowances were issued in excess of verified emissions, creating substantial additional profits for Swedish industry. In relative terms, overallocation was least for Slovenia and Poland, where 88 of allocated allowances had to be used for compliance, leaving 1/8 of allowances for sale on the carbon market. It was above all through between 2008 and -2012 that additional profits were made through overallocation. In addition, the 15 sectors selected for more detailed calculations profited from using CERs for compliance, yielding an estimated profit of over 630 million euro. In relative terms, industry in France has benefited most from this source of profits. The largest additional profit category derived from passing through carbon costs. In a minimum variant we estimated that the additional profits in this category totalled over 15 billion euro for the 15 sectors in the 19 countries investigated. In Germany industry earned over 3 billion euro from windfall profits, while in the United Kingdom the figure was over 2 billion euro. In an average variant of cost pass-through rates, these additional profits may have been even higher and could amount to 26 billion euro. 3 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS To some extent, the revisions in Phase 3 of the EU ETS have tackled the problem of overallocation to industry through introduction of benchmarks and the cross-sectoral correction factor, although in some industries and countries the problem of overallocation still exists. The additional profits generated through conversion of cheap CERs into EUAs and pass-through of carbon costs have thus far not been addressed, however. 4 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS Content cutive summary 2 1 Introduction 7 1.1 Background 7 1.2 Objective 8 1.3 Delineation 8 1.4 Differences with Sandbag 9 2 ological approach 11 2.1 Introduction 11 2.2 Profits from overallocation 11 2.3 Conversion of CERS to EUAs 14 2.4 Cost pass-through 16 2.5 Total additional profits 20 3 Austria 21 3.1 General description 21 3.2 Detailed tables 21 4 Belgium 24 4.1 General description 24 4.2 Tables 24 5 Czech Republic 27 5.1 General description 27 5.2 Tables 27 6 Denmark 30 6.1 General description 30 6.2 Tables 30 7 Finland 33 7.1 General description 33 7.2 Tables 33 8 France 36 8.1 General description 36 8.2 Tables 36 5 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS 9 Germany 39 9.1 General description 39 9.2 Tables 39 10 Greece 42 10.1 General description 42 10.2 Tables 42 11 Hungary 45 11.1 General description 45 11.2 Tables 45 12 Ireland 48 12.1 General description 48 12.2 Tables 48 13 Italy 51 13.1 General description 51 13.2 Tables 51 14 The Netherlands 54 14.1 General description 54 14.2 Tables 54 15 Poland 57 15.1 General description 57 15.2 Tables 57 16 Portugal 60 16.1 General description 60 16.2 Tables 60 17 Slovak Republic 63 17.1 General description 63 17.2 Tables 63 18 Slovenia 66 18.1 General description 66 18.2 Tables 66 19 Spain 69 19.1 Sectoral approach 69 19.2 Top-20 companies 69 6 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS 20 Sweden 72 20.1 Sectoral approach 72 20.2 Top-20 companies 72 21 United Kingdom 75 21.1 Sectoral approach 75 21.2 Top-20 companies 75 22 Literature 78 Annex A Potential calculation of international credit profits in 2013 and 2014 80 7 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The EU ETS is the cornerstone of the climate policies of the European Union. Through the EU ETS about 45 of GHG emissions are being regulated from the entire electricity generation and the majority of the industry sector. When measured in size, the EU ETS is the largest emission trading system in the world. It serves as a blueprint for many emission trading systems being currently designed worldwide. Last year the 10th anniversary of the carbon reduction policy instrument was celebrated. However, despite the size, impact and durability of the EU ETS, the policy instrument has been criticized from the outset. The critiques especially relate to the potential lack of regulatory incentives that stem from the system, especially when uated as being additional to the other climate policy instruments.1 This is most pressing for sectors, such as industry, that have largely been set free from auxiliary regulatory instruments because they participate in the EU ETS. The main purpose of the upcoming revision for Phase 4 of the ETS 2021-2030 is therefore to try to set the incentives right so the EU ETS can steer companies in their transation towards a low-carbon economy. One of the particular annoyances of the present system of the ETS has been the lobbying from industrial organisations for more free allowances. Industry sponsored research, such as Copenhagen Economics 2015 for the fertilizer industry, has suggested that industrial sectors would require free allowances above present emissions in order to stay competitive. Politicians, confronted with a regulatory system that is complex to understand, often lend their ears to such claims that sound reasonable at first sight. However, such studies often lack a proper assessment of the costs and benefits associated with the system. Against the background of such studies and claims, this study aims to identify and calculate the potential profits that companies have received under the EU ETS so far. This study makes clear that industry, so far, has massively benefitted from the EU ETS due to generous allocation of free allowances, widespread possibilities to use cheap international credits for compliance and the general tendency to base prices on marginal costs which include cost pass- through of a large share of their freely obtained allowances. These benefits may not have received enough exposure. This study builds upon earlier work by Carbon Market Watch CMW, 2015 by quantifying these benefits in a transparent way. 1 Some ex-post investigations have claimed that the EU ETS so far has not really contributed to emission reduction additional to the existing renewable energy support schemes. Others, e.g. CE Delft, 2015, have argued that although the scheme has contributed to emission reductions in e.g. the UK power market when prices rose above the € 20/tCO2, the present system has been so overfloaded with free allowances that the regulatory impact has been minimalized. 8 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS 1.2 Objective The objective of this project is to deliver a report containing a country-by-country analysis of the additional profits that sectors and companies have made from the EU ETS between 2008-2014. The analysis will focus on fifteen sectors with substantial carbon emissions. The analysis will be undertaken for nineteen countries all the EU MS that are part of the OECD minus Luxembourg. For each of these countries, a top-20 list will be published of companies receiving most additional profits from the ETS. The choice for MS that are also part of the OECD is driven by the fact that for these countries a uni ology can be created for treatment of waste gases in the ETS. The choice for excluding Luxembourg is given that Carbon Market Watch has already published a report analysing the Luxembourg situation in the ETS. 1.3 Delineation 1.3.1 Definition of additional profits Additional profits have been defined here as profits stemming from three categories  Overallocation of free emission allowances. Free allowances have often been granted in excess to the verified emissions so that industry received more free allowances than they needed being able to sell the surplus on the market or to bank them if they expect that this is more profitable due to future price increases.  Use of CDM/JI credits for compliance. In this case companies have used cheaper international credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s market mechanisms, e.g. the Clean Development Mechanism CDM or Joint Implementation JI, for compliance instead of their free allowances. They have instead sold the remaining free allowances on the market or banked them for compliance in later years.  Passing through carbon costs. Although the allowances have been granted for free, the majority of sectors were able to pass through the opportunity costs of these allowances into product prices obtaining so-called windfall profits according to the research literature on this topic. Eventual other profits or costs associated with the EU ETS e.g. higher electricity prices or compensations received for indirect cost price increases or profits and losses from hedging behaviour on the carbon markets have not been taken into account in this study. 1.3.2 Definition of countries The analysis has been undertaken for nineteen countries all of the EU MS that are also part of the OECD, minus Luxembourg. The countries are  Austria;  Belgium;  Denmark;  Finland;  France;  Germany;  Greece;  Ireland;  Italy;  The Netherlands; 9 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS  Portugal;  Spain;  Sweden;  United Kingdom;  Poland;  Hungary;  Czech Republic;  Slovak Republic;  Slovenia. 1.3.3 Delineation of sectors The analysis has been undertaken for several sectors that have the highest carbon emissions in the ETS, excluding electricity, heat and aviation. Some additional sectors have been included since some companies that are active one carbon intensive sector tend to have installations in other sectors as well. The following sectors have been included in this study.  Refineries 19.20;  Extraction of crude petroleum and gas 06.10;  Iron and Steel 24.10;  Manufacture of coke oven products 19.10;  Cement 23.51;  Lime 23.52;  Petrochemicals 20.14;  Inorganic chemicals 20.13;  Industrial gases 20.11;  Manufacture of plastics in primary 20.16;  Fertilizers 20.15;  Flat glass 23.11;  Hollow glass 23.13;  Other glass 23.14;  Manufacturing of bricks 23.32. 1.3.4 Delineation of companies We use in this research, next to sectors and installations, individual companies by linking the installations to their legal owners. This provides additional ination on the total net profits for individual companies. We take here as an entity, as much as possible, the company that publishes an annual financial report as one company. Moreover, only the installations that fall under the abovementioned fifteen sectors are taken into account in the calculus. If, e.g., a company active in the manufacturing of bricks NACE 23.32, also has installations that produce tiles NACE 23.31, these installations are not being attributed to this individual company. 1.4 Differences with Sandbag The present study slightly differs with respect to analysis and data used from that of other organisations. We have used for this report data from an in-house developed database of individual installations that are further differentiated towards economic sectors, products and legal ownership taking into account publicly available data and combining various databases. This in-house developed database contains over 16,000 installations and is coupled with additional statistical ination, such as Eurostat. Sandbag has published a range of studies containing analysis of the additional profits companies have received from overallocation of free allowances. 10 March 2016 7.H44 – Calculation of additional profits of sectors and firms from the EU ETS Our analysis is in design very similar to Sandbag and res